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INTRODUCTION
The technological advancements witnessed by our society in recent decades have broughtimprovements in our quality of life, but they have also created a number of opportunities forattackers to cause harm. Before the Internet revolution, most crime and malicious activitygenerally required a victim and a perpetrator to come into physical contact, and this limitedthe reach that malicious parties had. Technology has removed the need for physical contactto perform many types of crime, and now attackers can reach victims anywhere in the world,as long as they are connected to the Internet. This has revolutionised the characteristics ofcrime and warfare, allowing operations that would not have been possible before.
In this document, we provide an overview of the malicious operations that are happening onthe Internet today. We first provide a taxonomy of malicious activities based on the attacker’smotivations and capabilities, and then move on to the technological and human elementsthat adversaries require to run a successful operation. We then discuss a number of frame-works that have been proposed to model malicious operations. Since adversarial behavioursare not a purely technical topic, we draw from research in a number of fields (computer sci-ence, criminology, war studies). While doing this, we discuss how these frameworks canbe used by researchers and practitioners to develop effective mitigations against maliciousonline operations.
1 A CHARACTERISATION OF ADVERSARIES
[1][2][3, 4][5, 6, 7][8][9, 10]
In this section, we present a characterisation of adversaries who perform malicious actions.This characterisation is based on their motivation (e.g., financial, political etc.). Although al-ternative characterisations and taxonomies exist (e.g., from the field of psychology [11]), wefeel that the one presented here works best to illustrate known attackers’ capabilities and thetools that are needed to set up a successful malicious operation, such as a financial malwareenterprise. This characterisation also follows the evolution that cybercrime has followed inrecent decades, from an ad-hoc operation carried out by a single offender to a commoditisedecosystem where various specialised actors operate together in an organised fashion [12, 13].The characterisation presented in this section is driven by case studies and prominent exam-ples covered in the research literature, and as such is not meant to be complete. For example,we do not focus on accidental offenders (e.g., inadvertent insider threats), or on criminal oper-ations for which rigorous academic literature is lacking (e.g., attacks on financial institutionsor supply chain attacks). However, we believe that the set of crimes and malicious activi-ties presented is comprehensive enough to draw a representative picture of the adversarialbehaviours that are occurring in the wild at the time of writing. We begin by defining twotypes of cyber offences as they have been defined in the literature, cyber-enabled and cyber-dependent crimes, and we continue by presenting different types of malicious activities thathave been covered by researchers.
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Cyber-enabled and cyber-dependent crimes
One of the main effects that the Internet has had on malicious activity has been to increasethe reach of existing crimes, in terms of the ease of reaching victims, effectively removingthe need for physical proximity between the victim and the offender. In the literature, thesecrimes are often referred to as cyber-enabled [1].
According to Clough [14], criminals have five main incentives to move their operations online:
1. Using the Internet, it is easier to find and contact victims. Email lists are sold on under-ground markets [15], while online social networks have search functionalities embed-ded in them, allowing criminals to easily identify potential victims [16, 17].
2. By using the Internet, criminal operations can be run more cheaply. Sending emails isfree, while scammers previously had to pay postage to reach their victims. This alsoallows criminals to increase the scale of their operations to sizes that were previouslyunthinkable.
3. Compared to their physical counterparts, the Internet allows crimes to be performedfaster. For example, emails can reach victims in a matter of seconds, without having towait for physical letters to be delivered.
4. Using the Internet, it is easier to operate across international boundaries, reaching vic-tims located in other countries. In this setting, often the only limitation is language, withcriminals only targeting victims who speak a language that they are familiar with (e.g.,people in English-speaking countries) [18].
5. By operating over the Internet, it is more difficult for criminals to get caught. This ismainly due to the transnational nature of cybercrime, and the fact that the problem ofharmonising the appropriate laws of different countries is far from being solved [19].In addition, research shows that online crime is often under reported, both becausevictims do not know whom to report it to (given that the offender might be located inanother country), as well as the fact that they believe that they are unlikely to get theirmoney back [20].
Cyber-dependent crimes, on the other hand, are crimes that can only be committed with theuse of computers or technology devices [1]. Although the final goal of this type of crime oftenhas parallels in the physical world (e.g., extortion, identity theft, financial fraud), the Internetand technology generally enable criminals to give a new shape to these crimes, making themlarge-scale organised endeavours able to reach hundreds of thousands, if not millions, ofvictims.
In the rest of this section we analyse a number of cyber-enabled and cyber-dependent crimi-nal schemes in detail.
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Interpersonal offenders
The first category that we are going to analyse is that of interpersonal crimes. These crimesinclude targeted violence and harassment, directed at either close connections (e.g., familymembers) or strangers. While these crimes have always existed, the Internet has made thereach of harassers and criminals much longer, effectively removing the need for physicalcontact for the offence to be committed. As such, these crimes fall into the cyber-enabledcategory. In the rest of this section, we provide an overview of these adversarial behaviours.
Cyberbullying. Willard [2] defines cyberbullying as ‘sending or posting harmful material orengaging in other forms of social aggression using the Internet or other digital technologies’.While not always illegal1, cyberbullying often occupies a grey area between what is consid-ered a harmful act and a criminal offence [21]. This practice has become a serious problemfor young people, who are often targeted by their peers not only in real life, but also on onlineplatforms [22]. While the practice of bullying is nothing new, the Internet has changed thedynamics of these harassment practices significantly. What used to be a harmful practicelimited to school hours now can be perpetrated at any time, effectively exposing victims tonon-stop harassment [23].
One aspect that makes cyberbullying different from traditional, physical harassment is thatpeople online can be anonymous, and do not have their name or face attached to the abusiveactivity that they are carrying out [24, 25]. Researchers found that interacting with peopleonline creates a disinhibition effect wherby personal traits are accentuated (i.e., negativepeople become meaner and positive people become nicer) [26]. This disinhibition effect canhave the effect of making some people more likely to engage in abusive activity than theywould do in the offline world [25]. Another aspect that contributes to disinhibition is the factthat online content distributed on certain platforms (e.g., snapchat, 4chan) is ephemeral, inthe sense that it is deleted after a certain period of time [27]. As such, harassers feel thattheir actions have no adverse consequences since there will be no hard evidence of it in thefuture.
Doxing. Another type of online harassment is the practice of doxing, an attack where thevictim’s private information is publicly released online [28]. This operation is usually part ofa larger harassment campaign, where the release of sensitive information is used as a wayof embarrassing the victim or facilitating further harassment, even in the physical world (forexample, by releasing information at the workplace or the home address of the victim).
The practice of doxing has become increasingly popular in recent years as a way of po-larising online discussion and silencing people. A prominent example is the #GamerGatecontroversy, where women activists were often attacked and had their personal informationposted online [29]. Doxing has been a primary vehicle for coordinated hate attacks run bypolarised online communities such as 4chan’s Politically Incorrect board (/pol/) [27]. As partof these attacks, anonymous users post information about their targets online (e.g., socialmedia pages, phone numbers, physical addresses), and then invite other people to carry outloosely coordinated attacks (called raids) against those people. These attacks usually con-sist of hate speech and other abusive language.
While prominent in the online harassment space, the practice of doxing is also used by otheroffenders. For example, it is one of the techniques used by hacktivist groups such as Anony-mous to put their targets on notice. We will discuss the other techniques used by hacktivists,
1While there is no definition of cyberbullying in UK law, some forms of it can be prosecuted under the Pro-tection from Harassment Act 1997.
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together with their motivations, later in this section.
Cyberstalking. Another harmful activity that has been facilitated by the Internet is stalk-ing. Cyberstalking is the practice of using electronic means to stalk another person [30, 31].Broadly speaking, we can identify two types of cyberstalkers: those who use the informationthat they find online to help them stalk their victim in real life (e.g., monitoring social mediato know their whereabouts), and those who use the means offered by online services to stalktheir victim purely online. Further, the stalkers who operate online are divided into those whoact purely passively, without any interaction with the victim, and those who perform interac-tions, for example, by sending their messages on a social network platform [32]. To countercyberstalking, legislation has recently been introduced in many countries, including the 2012Protections of Freedoms act in the UK and the 2000 Violence Against Women Act in the US.
Sextortion. An emerging crime that has risen to relevance is sextortion, where a criminal luresvictims to perform sexual acts in front of a camera (e.g., a webcam in a chatroom), recordsthose acts, and later asks for a monetary payment in order not to release the footage [33].Sextortion is becoming such a relevant threat that crime prevention agencies such as the Na-tional Crime Agency (NCA) in the UK are launching dedicated awareness campaigns againstit.2
Child predation. Another crime that is facilitated by the Internet is child predation [34]. Onlineservices are a fertile ground for criminals to find victims, whether on chats, online socialnetworks, or online gaming platforms. The offender will then groom their victims to eitherperform physical or online abuse [34]. Compared to the corresponding offline offence, onlinesexual predation has two main differences: first, the victim and the perpetrator almost neverknow each other in real life. Second, the victim demographics are more skewed towardsadolescents than young children, because the age at which kids start going online is slightlyhigher [35]. Offenders use a range of tactics, including pretending to be young people andchildren in order to groom their victims [36] and research has shown the potential vulnerabilityof children of all ages to such online identity deception [37].
Other offenders do not interact with children directly, but download and share child pornog-raphy on the Internet. In such cases hands-on abusers often know their victims and dissem-inate child abuse material to these “users” of such material. This has been facilitated bypeer-to-peer sharing platforms [38, 39] as well as anonymising technologies such as Tor [40].The challenges of identifying originators of new child abuse material (and the deceptive tac-tics used by offenders, e.g., specialised vocabulary for filenames to thwart investigations) insuch peer-to-peer networks have also been studied [39].
Cyber-enabled organized criminals
In this section, we focus on cyber-enabled crimes that are carried out by career criminals. Inparticular, we provide two prominent examples of cyber-enabled crimes that have receivedsignificant attention by the research community: advance fee fraud and drug dealing. Thesecrimes are not usually carried out by single offenders, but rather by multiple criminals whoact together in small organisations [41] or in actual structured criminal organisations [42].We acknowledge that other crimes exist that have seen increased reach because of tech-nology. However, these crimes have yet to be studied in depth by the research communityand, therefore, we decided to focus on the one which the research community has a betterunderstanding of.
2http://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/crime-threats/kidnap-and-extortion/sextortion
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Advance fee fraud. In this type of scam, the victim is promised a reward (financial or other-wise), but in order to obtain it has to first pay a small fee to the fraudster. After the paymenttakes place, the victim often does not hear from the scammer again, while sometimes the re-lationship lasts for long periods of time and the victim is repeatedly defrauded of large sumsof money [43].
The archetypal example of advance fee fraud comprises so-called 419 scams [3]. Namedafter the section of the Nigerian Criminal Code dealing with fraud, these scams became pop-ular in the 1980s, when victims would receive physical letters from an alleged Nigerian prince,looking to transfer large amounts of money outside of the country. To initiate the process,the victim is required to transfer a small amount of money to the fraudster (e.g., to cover legalfees). As it can be imagined, the Internet allowed this type of fraud to flourish, by enablingcriminals to instantly reach a large number of potential victims.
Another example of advanced fee fraud is consumer fraud perpetrated on classifieds web-sites such as Craigslist [44]. As part of this fraud, victims respond to a classified adver-tisement for a desirable item (e.g., a used car or a rental property) which has much betterconditions (such as a lower price) than similar posts. The fraudster responds that they willneed a small upfront payment to deliver the goods. After receiving it, the victim will not hearfrom the fraudster again.
A final example of advanced fee fraud is the online romance fraud. Taking place on onlinedating sites, this type of fraud usually consists in criminals posing as attractive individualslooking to start a relationship with the victim. Unlike the 419 scam, these online relationshipsoften last for months before the fraudster demands money, for example, to help their familyor to open a business [41]. By that time, the victim, who is likely emotionally involved withthe persona impersonated by the criminal, is likely to comply. Previous research reportedthat victims of this crime can lose between £50 and £240,000 [43]. Unlike other types ofadvanced fee fraud, however, the psychological damage of losing the fictional relation canbe much greater than the financial one.
A common element of every type of advanced fee fraud is the need for criminals to build anenticing narrative that will lure victims into paying the fraudulent fee. To this end, criminalsoften target specific demographics and impersonate specific personas. For example, previ-ous research showed that romance fraudsters often pretend to be members of the militarystationed abroad [45]. By doing so, the fraudsters can build a credible narrative as to whythey cannot meet the victim in person, and they can build an emotional connection with thevictim, which will increase the chances of their falling for the scam. Often, fraudsters pretendto be widowed middle-aged men who target widowed women in the same demographic, inan attempt to establish an emotional connection with their victim [41]. In other cases, fraud-sters employ psychological tricks to win their victims over, such as applying time pressure orremarking that they specifically selected the victim because of their high moral characters [3].
More cynically, Herley argues that fraudsters are incentivised to build the most absurd nar-ratives possible, to make sure that only those who are gullible enough to believe them willreply, and that these people will be the most likely to fall for the scam [46]. His argument isthat responding to the first boilerplate message is expensive for the fraudster, while sendingthe first copy to as many victims as they wish is free. For this reason, it is in their interest torule out those who are not likely to fall for the scam as soon as possible.
Drug dealing. Another category of crimes for which the Internet has offered opportunitiesis the drug trade. Thanks to anonymising technologies such as Tor [47] and cryptocurren-
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cies [48], online marketplaces have emerged where drug users can purchase illicit substancesand have them delivered directly to their home. Research has shown that this business isthriving, despite the instability of these marketplaces, which are often taken down by law en-forcement [4, 49]. Online drug markets provide an interesting paradigm switch for drug users,because they remove the need for the buyer to interact with criminals in a physical and poten-tially unsafe setting. Recent work has shown, however, that the inception of the online drugmarket has not changed the worldwide drug trade ecosystem: the big players who produceand dispatch drugs remain broadly unchanged, while what has changed is the ‘last mile’ inthe delivery (i.e., how local dealers and drug users get in touch and do business) [42].
Cyber-dependent organized criminals
In this section, we describe crimes that have a financial goal and are carried out using com-plex technical infrastructures (e.g., botnets [50]). Unlike the cyber-enabled crimes describedin the previous section, where the criminal is essentially replicating a physical criminal oper-ation and using the Internet to enhance his/her reach, in the case of cyber-dependent crimescriminals have to set up complex technological infrastructures to achieve their goals. Thecomplexity of these operations has prompted a compartmentalisation in the criminal ecosys-tem, where each malicious actor specialises in a specific part of a cybercriminal operation(e.g., infecting computers with malware or performing money laundering) and works togethertowards achieving a common goal. In this section, we provide some examples of cyber-dependent crimes that have been studied by the research literature in recent years. Then, inSection 2, we cover in detail the various elements that criminals need to put in place to maketheir operations successful.
Email spam. Email spam has been a major nuisance for Internet users for the past twodecades, but it has also been at the forefront of very successful criminal operations, whohave managed to monetise the sale of counterfeit goods and pharmaceuticals by reachingbillions of potential customers through malicious messages [51]. Email spam is defined asunsolicited bulk email; this definition highlights the two main elements of the problem: thefact that the messages received by victims are unsolicited (i.e., they were not requested inthe first place), and that they are sent in bulk to reach as many victims as possible.
Although the very first spam email was recorded in 1978 [52], email spam rose to prominencein the 1990s, when criminals set up small operations, not dissimilar from the advance-feefraud ones described in the previous section [53]. The goal of these operations was to sellgoods online, which could span from diet supplements to Nazi memorabilia [53]. At thisstage, relying on their own expertise and on the help of a small number of associates, crim-inals would carry out all the activities required to set up a successful spam operation: (i)harvesting email addresses to send the malicious messages to, (ii) authoring the email con-tent, (iii) sending the spam emails in bulk, (iv) processing the orders from people who wantedto purchase the advertised items, (v) reacting to raids by law enforcement (e.g., the seizureof an email server). Although they were still rudimentary compared to the spam operationsthat came during the next decade, these criminal endeavours prompted the development oflegislation to regulate unsolicited bulk emails, such as the Directive on Privacy and ElectronicCommunications in the EU,3 the Privacy and Electronic Communications Regulations in theUK4 and the CAN-SPAM Act in the US.5 These pieces of legislation helped prosecute some
3https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=celex%3A32002L00584https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Privacy and Electronic Communications (EC Directive) Regulations 20035https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CAN-SPAM Act of 2003
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of those early-day spammers. In 2004, America Online (AOL) won a court case against DavisWolfgang Hawke, who was selling Nazi gadgets through spam emails. Hawke was sentencedto pay a 12.8M USD fine.
The technical advancements of the early 2000s, and in particular the development of botnets,networks of compromised computers controlled by the same cybercriminal [50], gave un-precedented opportunities to criminals who want to engage in email spam today. Email spamis not a one-person operation anymore, rather it is supported by thriving criminal ecosystems.Spammers can rent botnets from criminals who are specialised in infecting computers withmalware [15], purchase lists of target email addresses from specialised actors [54] and signup to an affiliate programme [55, 56], which will provide the spammer with a way of advertis-ing, as well as taking care of shipments and payments.
The arms race connected to spam mitigation has been going on since the 1990s, with anumber of mitigations being proposed [57]. Currently, anti-spam techniques ensure that thevast majority of malicious emails will never reach their victims’ mailboxes. To solve thisissue, criminals have to send tens of billions of emails [15] to keep their operations profitable.Another issue is that, out of the victims reached by those spam emails that make it through,only a small fraction will purchase the advertised goods and turn a profit for the criminals.Researchers performed a case study for the Storm botnet [5], showing that out of 469 millionspam emails sent by the botnet, only 0.01% reach their targets. Of these, only 0.005% ofthe users click on the links contained in the emails, while an even lower number ends uppurchasing items - only 28 users in total out of the 469 million reached, or 0.0004% of the total.Despite this steep drop, McCoy et al. showed that popular spam affiliate programmes wereable to make up to 85 million USD of revenue over a three-year period [55]. They also showedthat key to this success are returning customers. In fact, spam emails need to reach aninterested customer only once, and this person can later keep purchasing on the site withouthaving to worry about spam filters.
Phishing. A particular type of spam is phishing, where criminals send emails that pretend tobe from genuine services (e.g., online banking, social network websites) [6]. These emailstypically lure users into handing out their usernames and passwords to these services bypresenting them with a believable email asking them to visit the website (e.g., to retrievetheir latest account statement). By clicking on the link in the email, users are directed to awebsite displaying fake but realistic login pages. Once they have input their credentials, thecriminals gain access to them and they will be able to later log in to those services on behalfof the users, potentially making money directly or selling the credentials on the black market.
For the criminal, a key component to the success of phishing pages is setting up web pagesthat resemble the original ones as much as possible. To facilitate this task, specialised cyber-criminals develop and sell so-called phishing kits [58], programmes that can be installed on aserver and will produce an appropriately-looking web page for many popular services. Thesekits typically also provide functionalities to make it easier for the criminal to collect and keeptrack of the stolen credentials [58]. Another element needed by criminals to host these pagesis servers under their control. Similar to spam, criminals, researchers, and practitioners areinvolved in an arms race to identify and blacklist phishing Web pages [59], therefore it doesnot make economic sense for criminals to set up their own servers. Rather, criminals oftenhost these websites on compromised servers, for which they do not have to pay [60].
After stealing a large number of credentials, criminals can either exploit these accounts them-selves or sell the usernames and passwords on the black market. Previous research hasshown that often these criminals log into the accounts themselves and spend time evaluat-
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ing their value, for example, by looking for financial information in webmail accounts.[18, 61].
Financial malware. Another popular criminal operation is financial malware. In this setting,criminals aim to install malware on their victims’ computers and steal financial credentialssuch as credit card numbers and online banking usernames and passwords. This trendstarted with the Zeus malware, which criminals could purchase on the black market anduse to set up their operations [62]. Once installed on a victim computer, Zeus would wait forthe user to visit a website on a pre-configured list of interesting ones that the criminal couldspecify. It would then record usernames and passwords as the user typed them in, and sendthem to the command and control server set up by the criminal.
A more sophisticated information stealing botnet was Torpig [7]. Unlike Zeus, Torpig used abotnet-as-a-service model, where a single specialised criminal was responsible for hostingthe botnet infrastructure, while other criminals could run their campaigns to infect victimcomputers, pay a fee to use the torpig infrastructure and later retrieve the stolen credentials.Researchers showed that, in 2009, the Torpig botnet was able to steal 8,310 unique bankaccount credentials and 1,660 unique credit card numbers over a ten-day period. [7].
To monetise their operations, cybercriminals can sell the stolen financial information on ded-icated underground forums [63]. The price that criminals can ask for these credentials variesbased on the type of records that they were able to steal. For example, on the undergroundmarket there are two types of credit card records that are traded: dumpz, which contain theinformation that allows a criminal to clone a credit card (i.e., card number, expiration date, se-curity code), and fullz, which also contain the billing address associated with the card. Fullzare worth more money on the black market, because they allow miscreants to purchase itemsonline.
A related type of crime that is becoming more popular is card skimming [64]. In this cyber-enabled crime, criminals install devices on ATM machines which collect details of the cardsinserted into the machines by unwitting users. The criminal can then collect the devices toretrieve the stolen financial credentials. While this type of crime is serious, it is also a goodexample of the limitations of physical crime compared to their online counterparts: the needfor physical action by the criminal limits the scale of the operation, while financial malwareoperations can affect much higher numbers of victims. For example, the Torpig malware wasinstalled on over 100,000 computers [7].
Note that malware is not always needed to perform financial fraud. In some cases, insiderthreats within financial organisations could act maliciously and defraud both their institutionsand their customers [65, 66]. In other cases, financial information such as credit card num-bers could be stolen by exploiting a vulnerability in an online system (e.g., by dumping thedatabase of an online store) [67]. In other cases, stolen SWIFT credential of banks can beused to perform large fraudulent money transfers [68]
Click fraud. Web advertisements are the main way the Web is monetised. A Web administra-tor can decide to host advertisements on his/her website, and whenever visitors view themor click on them they receive a small fee from an advertiser. To mediate this interaction, spe-cialised services known as ad exchanges have emerged. Because of their easy monetisation,Web advertisements are ripe for fraud. In particular, criminals can host advertisements ontheir own websites and then generate ‘fake’ clicks (e.g., by using bots). This results in an adexchange paying criminals for ad impressions that were not ‘genuine,’ eventually defraudingthe advertiser.
Once again, criminals are involved in an arms race with ad exchanges, who are interested in
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keeping fraud on their services minimal. To help criminals generate large numbers of clicksand remain under the radar by gaining access from large numbers of IP addresses, so-calledclick fraud botnets have emerged. An example is Zeroaccess [69], which was active in 2013.On an infected machine, this malware would act like a regular user, browsing websites andclicking on advertisements that its owner chose. Researchers showed that this botnet wasresponsible for losses to the advertising industry of approximately 100,000 USD per day [69].
Unauthorised cryptocurrency mining. With the increasing popularity of cryptocurrencies, anew opportunity has opened up for criminals: using infected computers to mine currency. In2014, Huang et al.revealed this threat, showing that botnets were used to mine Bitcoin [70].While revealing this new monetisation for malware, the authors also concluded that theseoperations did not appear to be making much money, totaling at most 900 USD a day.
A more recent study, however, showed that cryptocurrency mining by botnets could be muchmore rewarding than previously thought. Pastrana and Suarez-Tangil showed that by miningMonero and using a number of techniques to increase their chances of mining currency (e.g.,using mining pools) criminals could make up to 18 million USD over a two-year period. [71].
Another emerging trend in cybercrime comprises leveraging Web browsers to mine cryptocur-rencies. Instead of installing malware on victim computers and using them for mining, mis-creants add scripts to webpages and have their visitors mine cryptocurrencies. This type ofmalicious activity is called cryptojacking. Although using these scripts is not necessarily ille-gal (i.e., Web administrators can legitimately install them on their webpages in a similar wayto advertisements), criminals have been caught adding them to compromised websites onmultiple occasions. Konoth et al. showed that a malicious campaign can make GBP 31,000over a week [72], while Ru¨th et al. [73] showed that 1.18% of the mined blocks in the Moneroblockchain can be attributed to Coinhive, the most popular cryptojacking library.
Ransomware. The newest trend in malware is Ransomware. As part of this operation, crim-inals infect their victim systems with malware which encrypts the user’s personal files (e.g.,documents) and sends the encryption key to the criminal, who then asks for a ransom inexchange for giving the user access to their data again [74]. The idea of malicious softwarethat uses public key cryptography to hold the victim’s data hostage is not new, and it was the-orised by Yung in 1996 already [75]. In 20 years, however, the technological advancementson the malware delivery end have made it possible to reach large numbers of victims, and theintroduction of anonymous payment methods such as Bitcoin has made it safer for criminalsto collect these payments.
Ransomware is, at the time of writing, the gold standard for cybercriminals. This type of mal-ware operation has solved the monetisation problems that were so important in other typesof cybercriminal schemes: the criminal does not have to convince the victim to purchase agood, like in the case of email spam, or to fall for a fraud, like in the case of phishing. Inaddition, the victim is highly incentivised to pay the ransom, because the probability that thecriminals have encrypted files that the user will need (and for which they have no backupcopy) is high. In fact, recent research was able to trace 16 million USD in payments on theBitcoin blockchain that can be attributed to ransomware campaigns [76].
Although the most sophisticated ransomware campaigns involve encrypting the victim’s files,Kharraz et al. showed that it is not uncommon for malware authors to use other techniques tolock the victim out of his/her computer [77]. These techniques include setting up a password-protected bootloader and not giving the password to the user unless he/she pays. Whilethese techniques are likely to yield a profit for the criminal, they are also easier to mitigate,
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as the victim’s files are safe on the computer and a simple clean up of the malware (andrestoring the original master boot record) can fix the problem.
Denial of service. A feature that all Internet-connected devices have is network connectivity.A criminal can leverage the bandwidth of an infected device to perform a Distributed Denial ofService (DDoS) attack against a target. Criminals can simply use the bandwidth generated bythe botnet, or leverage amplification attacks (i.e., network traffic generated by misconfigurednetwork devices, or devices with poor default settings) to enhance the power of their DDoSattacks [78].
The criminals can then set up services where they offer DDoS for hire. These services areappealing for example to unscrupulous actors who want their business competitors to gooffline or to online gamers who want to knock their opponents off the Internet to win thegame [79]. To hide the illicit nature of their business, these services often advertise them-selves as ‘stress testers’, services that a Web administrator can use to test how their Web ap-plications perform under stress [79]. In reality, however, these services do not check whetherthe customer purchasing a DDoS attack is actually the same person who owns the targetdomain.
Hacktivists
While criminals driven by profit are a big threat, not all adversaries are driven by money. Inparticular, we define the act of computer crime motivated by a political goal as hacktivism [8].These crimes can take various forms, from denial of service attacks [8] to compromisingcomputer systems with the goal of releasing sensitive information to the public [80]. Thereis an ongoing debate among scholars on whether actions by hacktivists fall under politicalactivism (e.g., civil disobedience) or cyber terrorism [81]. Holt et al. studied cyber attackscarried out by far left groups in the US and found that there was an increase in online attacksduring periods that observed a decrease in physical violence from those same groups [82].
Denial of service. The practice of hacktivism started in the 1990s with netstrikes [83]. Aspart of this practice, Internet users would connect to target the websites simultaneously todeplete their resources and make them unresponsive. This was often done to protest againstactions and policies by government agencies and corporations. Twenty years later, with theincreased sophistication offered by technology, hacktivist groups such as Anonymous [84]took the idea of netstrikes and made it bigger in size. This collective became popular forlaunching denial of service attacks against organisations that were guilty of performing ac-tions that did not match their moral stance, such as governments linked to the repression ofthe Arab Spring, credit card companies who would not make donations to entities such asWikileaks or radical religious organisations.
To perform their attacks, Anonymous would ask its sympathisers to install a computer pro-gram, called Low Orbit Ion Cannon (LOIC), which would act as a bot in a botnet: their controllerwould use the computer’s bandwidth to carry out a denial of service attack against a chosentarget. The difference with traditional botnets (and the ones used to carry out DDoS attacksin particular) is that the user is accepted to be part of it by installing the LOIC program, andsuffered law enforcement action as a consequence.
Data leaks. Another trend that we have been observing in recent years in the area of hack-tivism is the release of stolen documents into the public domain, for example, to raise aware-ness about secret surveillance programs by governments [85]. A prominent example of an
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organisation that performs these data leaks is Wikileaks [80]. Similar techniques have alsobeen used by Anonymous (e.g., about the identity of 1,000 Ku Klux Klan members).
Web Defacements. The last trend that is typical of politically-motivated actors is Web de-facement [86]. As part of this activity, miscreants exploit vulnerabilities (ranging from weakpasswords to software vulnerabilities) in the websites of organisations they disagree with,and use them to change the home page of the website to a politically-charged one. An exam-ple of an organisation that is prominently using Web defacements to spread their messageis the Syrian Electronic Army [87], a group of hackers close to the Assad regime. Althoughpopular with criminals with a political agenda, Web defacement is not just their prerogative.In fact, Maimon et al. showed that this is a popular way for early career cybercriminals toprove their worth [88].
State actors
Another type of malicious actor involved in adversarial behaviours online comprises nationstates. In the past few years, we have observed an escalation in the use of computer attacksby state actors to achieve their goals. Broadly speaking, this type of attack differs from thoseperformed by financially motivated cybercriminals for two reasons:
1. Commodity cybercrime needs to gather as many victims as possible to maximise theirprofits. For instance, criminals setting up a botnet to steal financial information fromtheir victims will want to reach the highest possible number of victims to improve theirrevenue. This means that the cybercriminal’s attacks need to be either generic or di-versified enough to cover a large population of devices (e.g., by using exploit kits, asexplained in Section 2). In a state-sponsored attack, on the other hand, there is no needto make money, and usually the victim is well defined (e.g., a specific organisation or aperson of interest). In this setting, the attack can be tailored to the victim; this increasesthe chances of success, because of the time that can be spent designing the attack andthe fact that the attack will be unique (e.g., by using a zero day attack [89]), and it willbe unlikely that existing protection software will catch it.
2. Because of the need to make money, traditional cybercriminals need their attacks to befast. This is not the case for state-sponsored attacks, where the reward for achievingits goal (e.g., stealing sensitive information from a government) makes it acceptable towait for long periods of time before finalising the attack.
State-sponsored attacks fall broadly into three categories, depending on the purpose of theattack: sabotage, espionage, and disinformation. In the following, we describe these threetypes of attacks in more detail.
Sabotage. Modern critical infrastructure can be disrupted by electronic means. Researchhas shown that it is not uncommon for critical facilities such as power plants to have somesort of network connectivity between the computers controlling the machinery and the onesconnected to the Internet [90]. In the case of a state adversary, even having network securityappliances to guard the boundary between the two networks is not enough, since, as wesaid, attacks can be so sophisticated and tailored that off-the shelf solutions fail to detectthem [9]. Once a piece of malware manages to get into the control network, it could make themachinery malfunction and potentially destroy it. Even when there is a physical separationbetween the control network and the wider Internet, attacks are still possible when we arefaced with adversaries with virtually unlimited resources [9].
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A prominent example is the Stuxnet worm [91, 9], a sophisticated attack performed againstthe Nathanz nuclear enrichment facility in Iran in 2010. Allegedly, the malware was introducedinto the facility by first infecting the laptop of one of the consultants who was maintainingthe machinery. Once the malware was in the right environment, it identified the pieces ofequipment that it was designed to target and sabotaged the enrichment experiments, makingthe centrifuges spin out of control. To date, Stuxnet is a textbook example of the lengths towhich state-sponsored attackers can go to achieve their objectives, and of the sophisticationthat their attacks can achieve.
Sabotage is not always linked to state actors. Major incidents have been caused by disgrun-tled employees of companies who acted as insider threats, like in the case of the MaroochyWater Services [92]. In this incident an insider whose employment had not been confirmeddecided to get revenge on the company by spilling sewage, causing major environmentaldamage [92].
Espionage. Another goal that state-sponsored actors have for their attacks is spying on op-ponents and prominent adversaries. Research has shown that state actors make prominentuse of spearphishing (i.e., targeted phishing) to lure activists and companies into installingmalware that is later used to spy on them [18, 93]. In other cases, state actors infect sen-sitive systems (e.g., servers in large corporations), with the goal of stealing sensitive infor-mation [94]. The security industry has dubbed these long-standing, sophisticated attacksAdvanced Persistent Threats.
Disinformation. In the past two years evidence has emerged that state-sponsored actorshave been involved in spreading disinformation on social media [95, 96, 97, 10]. This hasbeen done through troll accounts that acted to polarise online discussion on sensitive top-ics [98]. While social networks such as Twitter have made data about accounts related tostate-sponsored disinformation publicly available [95, 10], rigorous evidence is still missingon how these operations are carried out on the backend. For example, the extent in which theaccounts involved in disinformation are controlled by human operators as opposed to botsis not clear.
2 THE ELEMENTS OF A MALICIOUS OPERATION
[99][100][101][102, 103][13][104, 105]
As we showed in Section 1, malicious operations can use rather complex infrastructures,particularly in the case of organised crime, which is mostly motivated by two facts. First, thecriminal needs these operations to be as cost effective as possible (and consequently makethe highest possible profit). Second, multiple actors (law enforcement, security companies,the users themselves) are constantly attempting to take down these malicious operations,and the criminal has, therefore, a need to make them resilient to these takedown attempts.
To ensure that the criminals’ needs are met in this scenario, in recent years we have wit-nessed a specialisation in the cybercriminal ecosystem, where different actors specialise ina specific element required for the operation to succeed; the miscreants then trade theseservices with each other on the black market. In this section, we provide an overview ofthe elements required for a cyber-dependent organised criminal operation to succeed, as de-scribed in Section 1. Many of the elements discussed, however, also apply to the other typesof adversarial behaviours described in that section.
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Affiliate Programmes
The main goal of organised crime is to make money from their operations. This requiresnot only a well-oiled technical infrastructure to make sure that their botnets operate properlybut, perhaps more importantly, a working method to collect payments from victims (or fromsponsors, in the case of DoS), while making sure that all the actors involved in the operationget paid.
In the cybercriminal world, this is typically done through affiliate programmes. An affiliate pro-gramme is a scheme where main organisation provides a ‘brand’ and all the means requiredto carry out orders, shipments and payments. Affiliates can join the program, direct traffic tothe platform, and get a cut of the sales that they are responsible for. Although this schemeexists for legitimate businesses (e.g., Amazon has an affiliate programme), it has been par-ticularly successful for cybercriminal operations. The main difference between legitimateand criminal affiliate programmes is that the second category of operations typically dealswith products that are considered illegal in most jurisdictions (e.g., counterfeit pharmaceuti-cals, gambling, counterfeit designer products) and they typically endorse criminal promotiontechniques (e.g., the use of malware or black hat search engine optimisation).
Affiliate programmes are popular in the cybercriminal world because they mean affiliates donot have to set up their operations from start to finish, but rather focus on attracting traffic,for example by setting up botnets and sending email spam advertising the affiliate market-place. The first successful examples of affiliate programmes for cybercrime were centredaround email spam, and were advertising counterfeit pharmaceuticals [51, 55, 56]. However,affiliate programmes are present in most types of cyber-dependent crime, an example beingthe Cryptowall ransomware operation.6
In addition to providing the monetisation necessary for cybercriminal operations, affiliateprogrammes also act as facilitators for criminals to get in contact and trade the servicesthat are needed for the operation to succeed. This is typically done by setting up a forumwhere affiliates can trade their services [55, 15]. Gaining access to these forums typicallyrequires vetting by the affiliate programme administrators.
Infection vectors
As discussed earlier, the first step required by criminals to perform a malicious activity is of-ten infecting their victims with malware. To this end, the criminals need to first expose theirpotential victims to the malicious content, and then have them install it on their machines(through either deception or by exploiting a software vulnerability in their system). In the fol-lowing, we survey three popular methods on delivering malware to victim computers. Notethat, while other infection vectors are possible, such as physical access to a network or hi-jacking a wireless network, to date we are not aware of any large-scale compromise involvingthese infection vectors, and therefore we do not focus on them.
Malicious attachments. Possibly the oldest method of delivering malware is attaching ma-licious software to spam emails, disguising it as useful content that the user might want toopen. This spreading technique was made popular by email worms in the early 2000s, suchas the ‘I love you’ worm [106], but it is still a popular way of delivering malware to victims [15].In the commoditised economy described previously, it is often the case that a criminal whowants to spread a malware infection pays another criminal who already has control of a bot-
6https://www.secureworks.com/research/cryptowall-ransomware
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net to deliver the payloads [7]. To be successful, the content used for this infection vectorneeds to convince the user to click on the attachment and install it. To this end, criminalsoften use deception techniques to make the content look interesting and appealing, simi-lar to the techniques discussed for phishing [6]. This deception falls into the area of socialengineering [107].
Black hat search engine optimisation. Search Engine Optimization (SEO) is a popular prac-tice whereby webmasters optimise their content so that it is better indexed by search enginesand appears among the first hits for relevant searches. Cybercriminals are also interestedin having their malicious Web pages appear high in search results, because this increasesthe chances that potential victims will find them and click on them. To accomplish this, spe-cialised criminals offer black hat SEO services. As a result of these services, malicious web-sites are pushed high up in search engine rankings for keywords that are unrelated to thewebsite [108]. This happens particularly often in proximity with popular events (e.g., sportsand political events), because people will be more likely to search for keywords related to theevent. To achieve effective black hat SEO, cybercriminals compromise vulnerable websitesand use them to promote their customers’ webpages (e.g., by adding invisible links and textpointing to the target webpage).
Drive-by download attacks. Although deceptively luring users into installing malware works,having an automated method that does not require human interaction is more advantageousfor cybercriminals. To this end, cybercriminals have perfected so-called drive-by downloadattacks [100]. As part of one of these attacks, the victim visits a webpage under the controlof the criminal (e.g., encountered through black hat SEO). The webpage contains maliciousJavaScript code that will attempt to exploit a vulnerability in the user’s Web browser or in oneof its plugins. If successful, the Web browser will be instructed to automatically downloadand install the malware.
To host their malicious scripts, cybercriminals often compromise legitimate websites [109].An alternative trend is purchasing Web advertisement space and serving the malicious con-tent as part of the ad, in a practice known as malvertisement [110].
Compromising of Internet-connected devices. As more devices get connected to the Inter-net (e.g., Internet of Things (IoT) devices), an additional opportunity provided to attackers isscanning the Internet for devices that present known vulnerabilities and exploit them to buildlarge botnets. A prominent example of this was the Mirai botnet [111].
Infrastructure
Another important element that criminals need for their operations to succeed is where tohost their infrastructure. This is important for both affiliate programmes (e.g., where to hostfraudulent shopping websites) as well as for botnet operations. Law enforcement and Inter-net Service Providers (ISPs) are continuously monitoring servers for evidence of maliciousactivity [101], and will take them down if this activity can be confirmed, which would put thecriminal operation in jeopardy.
Bulletproof hosting service providers. To maximise the chances of their operations beinglong-lived, cybercriminals resort to using so-called bulletproof hosting service providers [112,51]. These providers are well known not to comply with law enforcement takedown requests.This is made possible by either being located in countries with lax cybercrime legislation,or by the service provider operators actively bribing local law enforcement [51]. Bulletproofhosting service providers typically charge their customers more money than a regular ISP
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would. As such, they become a hotspot of illicit activity, since malicious users congregatethere because of their guarantees, but legitimate users have no incentive to use them. De-spite providing higher guarantees for cybercriminals, bulletproof hosting service providersare not invincible to takedown efforts. In particular, ISPs need to be connected to each otherto be able to route traffic, and an ISP that is uniquely hosting malicious content could bedisconnected by the other providers without many consequences for legitimate Internet traf-fic [51].
Command and control infrastructure. A botnet requires a command and control (C&C) infras-tructure that infected computers can be instructed to connect to, receive orders and reporton progress in the malicious operation. Originally, botnets would use a single command andcontrol server, although this would be a single point of failure. Even assuming that the serverwas hosted by a bulletproof hosting provider, and could not therefore be taken down, the factthat the server had a unique IP address meant that it could easily be blacklisted by securitycompanies.
To mitigate this problem, cybercriminals came up with C&C infrastructures that are redundantand more difficult to take down. An example is the multi-tier botnet infrastructure, where botsare instructed to connect to an intermediary C&C server, which is then responsible for relay-ing the information to and from a central control server [113]. This infrastructure makes thebotnet more resilient, because even if some of the relays are taken down, the central C&C isstill operational and additional relays can be added. In addition, the infected computers neversee the IP address of the central C&C server, making it more difficult to locate and take down.A variation of this model is peer-to-peer botnets, where infected computers with particularlygood connectivity and public IP addresses are ‘elected’ to act as relays [114]. This infras-tructure increases the flexibility that the criminal has and reduces the cost of the operation,because the criminal does not have to spend money to install relays. However, the botnetinfrastructure becomes vulnerable to infiltration, whereby researchers can create fake bots,be elected as relays and are thus suddenly able to monitor and modify the traffic comingfrom the central C&C [5].
Additional techniques used by cybercriminals to make their control infrastructure more re-silient are Fast Flux [115], where criminals use multiple servers associated with the C&C in-frastructure and rotate them quickly to make takedowns more difficult, and Domain Flux [116],in which the domain name associated to the C&C server is also rotated quickly. Both meth-ods are effective in making the operation more resilient, but they also make the operationmore expensive for the criminal to run (i.e., they have to purchase more servers and domainnames).
Specialised services
In this section, we describe specialised services that help criminals to set up their operations.In addition to these dedicated malicious services, others that have a legitimate use (e.g.,VPNs, Tor) are also misused by criminals, for example hosting drug market websites on theDark Net [117, 49].
Exploit kits. In the previous section, we saw that drive-by download attacks are a powerfulweapon that a cybercriminal can use to infect computers with malware without any humaninteraction. The problem with effectively performing these attacks, however, is that they re-quire an exploit to a software vulnerability in the victim’s system. Since cybercriminals wantto infect as many victims as possible, it is challenging to find an exploit that can work on
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the systems of the majority of potential victims. In addition to this issue, exploits do notage well, since software vendors routinely patch the vulnerabilities that they know about. Acybercriminal performing a sustained drive-by download operation, therefore, would need tocontinuously collate exploits to multiple vulnerabilities, a task that is unfeasible, especiallywhen the criminal also has to run other parts of the business (e.g., the monetisation part).Once a victim visits the exploit kit’s webpage, this tool first fingerprints the victim’s system,looking for a potential vulnerability to be exploited. It then delivers the exploit to the victim.If successful, the victim’s computer is instructed to download the malware of the customer’schoice.
These issues have created an opportunity for specialised criminals to provide services for therest of the community. This has led to the creation of exploit kits [102], which are tools thatcollect a large number of vulnerabilities and are sold on the black market for other criminalsto use. An exploit kit is typically accessible as a Web application. Customers can point theirvictims towards it by compromising websites or using malicious advertisements.
Pay-per-install services. Infecting victim computers and maintaining a botnet is a complextask, and research has shown that malware operators who attempt to do so without theproper expertise struggle to make profits [118]. To solve this issue and satisfy the demandfor stable botnets, a new criminal service has emerged called Pay Per Install service (PPI) ser-vices [103]. PPI operators are proficient in setting up a botnet and having it run properly. Othercriminals can then pay the PPI operator to install malware on the infected computers on theirbehalf. PPI services typically offer a good level of choice granularity to their customers, whonot only choose how many infections they want to install, but also their geographical location(with bots in developed countries costing more than infections in developing ones [103]).
An advantage of using PPI services is that they make their customers’ cybercriminal opera-tions more resilient: if their malware stops working, for example, because law enforcementhas taken down the C&C servers that it uses, the criminal can resume operations by askingthe PPI operator to install an updated version of their malware on the victim machines. Forthis reason, this malware symbiosis between PPI services and other botnets is very commonin the criminal ecosystem (see, for example, the symbiosis between Pushdo and Cutwail [15],and between Mebroot and Torpig [7]).
Human services
In this section, we discuss the auxiliary services that are needed for an end-to-end cybercrim-inal operation to succeed. Although these elements are not usually thought to be part ofcybercrime, they are as important to the success of a cybercriminal operation as the moretechnical elements.
CAPTCHA solving services. In some cases, cybercriminals need to set up accounts on on-line services to initiate their operations (e.g., a spam operation running on social networks [16,17]). To protect themselves against large-scale automated account creation, however, onlineservices widely use CAPTCHAs, which are notoriously difficult for automated programs tosolve. To solve this problem faced by cybercriminals, new CAPTCHA solving services havebeen established [119]. These services take advantage of crowdsourced workers. Once theCAPTCHA solving customer encounters a CAPTCHA, this is forwarded by the service to oneof these workers, who will solve it. This way, the customer can proceed and create the ac-count on the online service.
In other cases, online services require whoever has created an online account to receive a
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code texted to a phone number and issue that code back to the service. To overcome thisissue, cybercriminals can use services that automate this type of interaction [13].
Fake accounts. Since creating fake accounts is time consuming and requires the use ofauxiliary services such as CAPTCHA solvers, cybercriminals have started specialising in thecreation of fake accounts on multiple online services, and selling them on the black mar-ket [120]. Accounts on different services can have different prices, depending on the easeof creating new accounts on the platform and on how aggressively the service suspendssuspected fake accounts.
A problem with newly purchased fake accounts is that they do not have an established ‘re-puation’ on the social network, thus reducing their credibility to potential victims and theirreach in spreading malicious messages. This can be mitigated by using ‘reputation boost-ing’ services, which help to build a network of contacts for accounts that otherwise wouldnot have any. Examples of these are services offering fake likes on Facebook [121] and luringcompromised accounts into following the service’s customers on Twitter [122].
Content generation. In some cases, cybercriminals need to set up fake content to send totheir victims, whether this is for spam emails, fake websites used for black hat SEO or onlinesocial network sites. To generate this content, the criminals can recruit workers on under-ground forums [123].
Money mules. The main goal of many cybercriminal operations is to make money from theirvictims. However, extracting money from an operation is not easy. In the case of bank fraud,for example, even if the criminals obtain access to the victim’s bank account, they still needto transfer money to accounts under their control without being detected and apprehended.
To facilitate these monetisation operations, criminals take advantage of money mules [124].These are people who are recruited by criminals to perform money laundering operations andmake it more difficult for law enforcement to track the money obtained from an illicit oper-ation. In a money mule scheme, the criminal recruits a person to act as a mule and sendsthem money by using traceable means (e.g., a check or a wire transfer). The mule is theninstructed to transfer the money to an account under the criminal’s control by using untrace-able means (e.g., Western Union). The mule is also told that they can keep a percentage ofthe amount as a payment. Since these untraceable transactions need to be carried out inperson by the mule, they constitute a weak point in the monetisation operation, meaning thatlaw enforcement could identify and arrest the mule before the money is transferred. In fact,even if stolen money is never mentioned, the mule is participating in money laundering whenhe/she accepts this job.
An alternative way of monetising malicious operations, which is used in the case of stolencredit cards, is reshipping mules [67]. In these operations, criminal agencies recruit unsus-pecting users advertising a ‘shipping agent’ job. Then other criminals can recruit the servicesof these agencies, and purchase expensive items using stolen credit cards (e.g., electronics,designer goods), while sending them to the mule’s home address. The mule is then instructedto open the packages and reship the goods to a foreign address, where they will be sold onthe black market.
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Payment methods
As criminals need to have money transferred to them, they can use a number of differentpayment methods, each carrying a different level of risk and being more or less familiar tothe victims.
Credit card processors. Most transactions online are performed by credit cards. To collect asmany customers as possible, cybercriminals tend to accept credit card payments too. McCoyet al. showed that 95% spam affiliate programmes between 2007 and 2012 accepted creditcard payments [55], and that DDoS services that did not accept credit cards suffered withregard to the numbers of customers that they were able to attract [79]. Credit card processorskeep track of the chargebacks that a company has on its accounts, and too many complaintsfrom customers usually result in the company’s accounts being terminated. For this reason,many cybercriminal operations offer ‘customer support’ to their victims, offering refunds ifthey are not satisfied with their purchases [104].
A challenge that cybercriminals face is finding banks that are willing to process their pay-ments. Typically, these banks would charge them higher transaction fees (10-20%) to coverthe risk of dealing with criminal operations [55]. Despite these increased fees, it is not guaran-teed that the criminal operation will be safe: similar to what happens with bulletproof hostingISPs, banks need to maintain good relations with their peers, otherwise they will be discon-nected from the financial network [99].
Paypal. Another payment method that is familiar to users is Paypal. For this reason, Paypalis often accepted by criminals offering illicit services. While user friendly, criminals face theissue that the platform is centralised, and Paypal can keep track of fraudulent payments andterminate the accounts that are found to be in breach of the terms of service [108].
WesternUnion andother ‘untraceable’ payments. Other forms of payment offer more anonymityfor cybercriminals, and are less risky as well as being not as well regulated. Examples aremoney exchanges (e.g., Western Union, Money Gram) or pre-paid vouchers (Money Park).These are often used by criminals to transfer funds [125]. To cash the money, these servicesonly require a unique code and an identification document. Depending on the country wherethe criminal is located, however, the ID requirement might not be very rigorous.
Historically other ‘anonymous’ payment methods have existed such as Liberty Reserve, WebMoney and eGold [13]. These virtual currencies allowed criminals to easily make paymentsas they took advantage of the loose regulations in their country of origin (e.g., Liberty Reservewas based in Costa Rica). After crackdowns on these payment methods by law enforcement,criminals moved to other payment methods.
Cryptocurrencies. At the time of writing, probably the safest form of payment for cybercrim-inals is cryptocurrencies. These payments have become popular for multiple types of cyber-criminal operations, from ransomware [77] to drug market payments [4]. While research hasshown that customers are reluctant to use services that only accept cryptocurrencies [79],this type of payment still works when victims have no choice (e.g., in the case of ransomware)or are very motivated (e.g., in the case of drug markets).
While more anonymous than other payment methods, research has shown that paymentsmade in Bitcoin can be traced [105]. In addition, often cryptocurrencies need to be convertedinto real money by criminals, and the money ceases to be anonymous at that point. Additionalconcerns arise from the risks involved in making payments on cryptocurrency exchanges.Moore et al. showed that it is not uncommon for Bitcoin exchanges to suffer breaches that
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Figure 1: Example of an attack tree describing the action of breaking into a server.
result in losses of currency [126]. Exit scams, where an exchange vanishes with all the cur-rency stored in it, are also a problem [127].
3 MODELS TO UNDERSTAND MALICIOUS OPERATIONS
[128][129][130, 131, 132][13][133]
As shown in the previous sections, malicious operations can be quite complex and entailmultiple technical elements and multiple actors. It is, therefore, necessary for defenders tohave the appropriate means to understand these operations, so that they can develop thebest countermeasures. In the following, we survey a number of models that have been pro-posed to model malicious operations. These models come from a number of research areas,including computer security, criminology and war studies. Note that for space reasons wecannot discuss all the techniques that have been proposed in the literature to model attacks.For a more comprehensive list, we point the reader to [134].
Attack trees
The first way to model attacks against computer systems involve attack trees [128]. Attacktrees provide a formalised way of visualising a system’s security during an attack. In an attacktree, the root node is the goal of the attack, and its child nodes are the ways an attacker canachieve that goal. Going down the tree, each node becomes a sub-goal that is needed for theattack to succeed, and its children are possible ways to achieve it.
Figure 1 represents an example of an attack tree. In this example, the attackers aim to com-promise a server. To do this, they have two choices: they can either exploit a vulnerability orthey can obtain the password to the root account and log in using normal means. To exploita vulnerability, they can either develop the exploit themselves or purchase an already existingone, perhaps through an exploit kit. If the attackers decide to use the account’s passwordto log into the server, they first need to obtain it. To do this, they can either install malwareon the server administrator’s computer to log the password as they input it (i.e., a keylogger),guess the password using a list of commonly used ones or perform a bruteforce attack, andfinally extort the password from the owner. The attack graph could then be further refinedwith the possible ways the attacker could perform these actions (e.g., extorting the passwordby blackmailing the owner, by kidnapping them etc.).
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Attack trees allow two types of nodes, ‘or’ nodes and ‘and’ nodes. ‘Or’ nodes represent thedifferent ways attackers can achieve a goal (i.e., the children of any node in Figure 1). ‘And’nodes, on the other hand, represent the different steps that all need to be completed toachieve the goal. Once the tree has been created, security analysts can annotate it to as-sess the system’s risk to the attack, for example, by marking the various attack strategies asfeasible or unfeasible, by assigning likelihood scores to them or by estimating the cost foran attacker to perform a certain action. The scores can then be propagated along the treefollowing specific rules [128] to assess the overall feasibility and likelihood of the attack.
Another model that is related to attack trees is attack graphs [135]. While attack trees arelimited to single targets, attack graphs allow to model attack actors, vectors, vulnerabilities,and assets. Another useful model to understand network attacks are attack nets [136].
Kill chains
Another useful tool that can be used to model and understand attacks is kill chains. In themilitary context, a kill chain is a model that identifies the various phases involved in an at-tack.7 In the computer world, Hutchins et al. developed a Cyber Kill Chain [129] that modelsthe different steps involved in a malicious operation conducted against computer systems.In their model, Hutchins et al. identify seven phases. The model is designed for operationswhere the attacker identifies, compromises and later exploits a computer system, and, there-fore, not all the phases apply to all the adversarial behaviours discussed in this document.The seven phases are the following:
1. Reconnaissance, when attackers identify possible targets. This phase could comprisean attacker scanning the network looking for vulnerable servers or a spammer purchas-ing a list of victim email addresses on the black market.
2. Weaponisation, when an attacker prepares the attack payload for use. This could con-sist in developing a software exploit against a newly identified vulnerability or craftingan advance-fee-fraud email.
3. Delivery, when the attacker transmits the payload to its victim. This could consist insetting up a malicious webserver, purchasing advertisement space to perform a malver-tising attack or sending an email containing a malicious attachment.
4. Exploitation, when the target’s vulnerability is exploited. This phase could entail a drive-by download attack, or the victim being lured into clicking on a malicious attachmentthrough deception.
5. Installation, when malicious software is downloaded, thus allowing the attacker to ben-efit from the victim machine. In their paper, Hutchins et al. considered an attackerwanting to maintain constant access to the victim computer, using a type of malwareknown as a Remote Access Trojan (RAT) [137].
6. Command and control, when the attacker establishes a C&C infrastructure and a com-munication protocol to control the infected computer.
7. Actions on objectives, when the infection is monetised. This could entail stealing sensi-tive information from the victim computer, encrypting the victim’s data with ransomware,mining cryptocurrencies, etc.
7https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kill chain
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For each of the seven steps, Hutchins et al. identified strategies to disrupt the maliciousoperations, following five possible goals (Detect, Deny, Disrupt, Degrade, Deceive). Examplesof these techniques include patching vulnerabilities, setting up intrusion detection systemson the network or deceiving the attacker by setting up honeypots [138].
Similar kill chains have been proposed by other researchers over the years. An example is theone proposed by Gu et al. to model botnet infections [139]. In this model, the authors identifyfive phases where an infection is separated: an inbound scan (similar to phase one in thepreviously described model), an inbound infection (similar to phase four from the previousmodel), an ‘egg’ download (analogous to phase five), a C&C phase (the same as phase six),and an outbound scan. At the time of developing this model, botnets were mostly acting ascomputer worms [140], scanning for vulnerable computers, infecting them, and using themto propagate further. While this model correctly depicted early botnets, it ceased to mapreality when botmasters started using other methods to install their malware and monetisetheir infections. Nowadays, worms are almost extinct, with the exception of the infamousWannaCry malware [141]. This example shows that it is difficult to develop models of attackerbehaviour that are resilient to changes in the modus operandi of attackers.
Environmental criminology
While cybercrime is a relatively new threat, physical crime has been studied by scholars fordecades. It is, therefore, interesting to investigate whether this established body of knowl-edge can be applied to better understand and mitigate the emerging threat of online crime.Environmental criminology, in particular, is a branch of criminology that focuses on criminalpatterns in relation to the space where they are committed and to the activities of the actorsinvolved (victims, perpetrators, and guardians) [130]. A particular challenge that arises whenwe attempt to apply environmental criminology theory to cybercrime is that the concept of‘place’ on the Internet is not as well defined as in the real world. In the following, we brieflyreview the key concepts of environmental criminology, and provide some examples of howthey could be applied to mitigating Internet crime.
Routine activity theory. Routine activity theory is a commonly used concept in environmentalcriminology, postulating that the occurrence of crime is mostly influenced by an immediateopportunity for one to commit a crime [142]. In particular, routine activity theory states thatfor a crime to happen, three components need to converge: (i) a motivated offender, (ii) asuitable target and (iii) the absence of a capable guardian.
These concepts could be useful for better modelling malicious activity online. For example,research has shown that botnet activity reaches a peak during daytime, when most vulner-able computers are switched on and the victims are using them, while it drops significantlyovernight [7]. In routine activity theory terms, this can be translated to the fact that whenmore potential victims are online, the opportunity for criminals to infect them increases andthis results in an increase in botnet activity.
Rational choice theory. Rational choice theory aims to provide a model as to why offendersmake rational choices to commit crime [143]. In the case of cybercrime, this model couldbe useful for understanding the reaction of criminals to mitigation as a rational choice, andhelp to model the implementation issues introduced by situational crime prevention suchas displacement. For example, when a bulletproof hosting provider is taken down by lawenforcement, what factors play a part in the criminal’s choice of the next provider?
Pattern theory of crime. Another theory, called the pattern theory of crime, allows researchers
KA Adversarial Behaviours | October 2019 Page 22
The Cyber Security Body Of Knowledge
www.cybok.org
to identify various places that are related to crime. These places are likely to attract offend-ers (crime attractors), they generate crime by the availability of crime opportunities (crimegenerators) and they enable crime by the absence of place managers (crime enablers).
Although defining places in cyberspace is not as straightforward as in physical space, think-ing in terms of pattern theory can help identify locations that are hotspots for cybercrime,whether they are particularly appealing targets, such as corporations storing sensitive data(attractors), poorly configured systems that are easier to compromise (generators) or onlineservices with poor hygiene that do not react promptly to spam/malware posted on their plat-forms (enablers). Identifying these hotspots can then be used to design appropriate coun-termeasures against the malicious activity (e.g., to whom to direct education campaigns).
Situational crime prevention. Situational crime prevention comprises a set of theories andtechniques that aim to reduce crime by reducing the opportunities for crime [144]. The ideasbehind situational crime prevention are based on three main concepts, which also apply tocybercrime:
• Crime is much more likely to happen in certain places (hotspots). This idea applies tothe context of cybercrime. As we have seen, criminals tend to concentrate their mali-cious servers in bulletproof hosting service providers, which provide them with guaran-tees that their operations can continue for long periods of time. At the opposite endof the spectrum, regarding victims, criminals tend to target computers with vulnerablesoftware configurations, which also constitute hotspots in this acception.
• Crime is concentrated in particular ‘hot products’. This also applies to cybercrime, withmiscreants focusing on whichever operations yield the highest profits (i.e., at the timeof writing, ransomware).
• Repeat victims are more likely to experience crime compared to other people. In thecontext of cybercrime, the same concept applies. A vulnerable computer that is notpatched is likely to be compromised again [140]. Similarly, in the case of advance feefraud, victims are likely to repeatedly fall for the fraud, because the narrative used by thecriminals particularly resonates with them [43]. In addition to the natural predispositionof victims to fall for similar scams again, criminals actively seek to contact past victimsof fraud, by compiling so-called suckers lists and sharing them with each other [145].
To reduce the opportunities for crime, situational crime prevention proposes five categoriesof mitigations. In the following, we list them along with some examples of mitigations againstcybercrime that have been proposed in the computer science literature and that can be groupedinto these categories:
• Increase the effort of crime. Mitigations here include deploying firewalls and settingup automated updates for software installed on computers.
• Increase the risk of crime. Mitigations here include reducing payment anonymity (e.g.,requesting an ID when someone cashes money from Western Union).
• Reduce rewards. Mitigations here include blocking supicious payments or parcels, orpenalising malicious search results.
• Reduce provocations. Examples here include applying peer pressure to rogue ISPs andbanks.
• Remove excuses. Typical mitigations in this category include running education cam-paigns or setting up automated redirects to divert victims who would have viewed mali-
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cious content, explain to them what happened and urge them to secure their systems.
An interesting aspect of the situational crime prevention framework is that it identifies, foreach mitigation, the implementation issues that arise when putting the mitigation in place [144].In the case of cybercrime, the two implementation issues that are most relevant are adapta-tion and displacement.
Adaptation embodies the fact that criminals will actively attempt to circumvent any mitiga-tion by making their operation stealthier or more sophisticated. This is a typical arms racethat can be observed in computer security research. When researchers started compilingblacklists of IP addresses known to belong to C&C servers, criminals reacted by developingFast Flux. When making payments through traditional means became more difficult due toincreased vetting, criminals moved on to cryptocurrencies. Considering adaptation is impor-tant when designing mitigations against cybercrime. In particular, effective mitigations arethose which the criminal cannot easily react to, or where adaptation comes at a financialprice (e.g., a reduction in revenue).
Displacement represents the fact that once mitigations are put in place, criminals can simplymove their operations elsewhere. While in the physical world how far criminals can travel isdictated by practical constraints, on the Internet moving from one ‘place’ to another is virtu-ally free. Examples of displacement include criminals starting to register DNS domains withanother registrar after their preferred one increased the domain price to curb misuse [146], ora multitude of drug markets opening to fill the gap left by Silk Road’s takedown [4]. Displace-ment effects are important when planning action against cybercrime. Generally speaking, amitigation should make it difficult for criminals to move elsewhere. Conversely, a mitigatingaction that simply displaces a cybercriminal operation without affecting its effectiveness isprobably not worth pursuing.
Researchers have applied Situational Crime Prevention to a number of computer crimes, in-cluding organisational data breaches [131] and the mitigation of software vulnerabilities [132].Following the discussion in this section, however, this framework could be applied to anycriminal activity that happens online.
Crime scripting. Another useful technique that can aid the analysis of malicious activitieson the Internet from the field of criminology is crime scripting [147]. As part of this technique,researchers extrapolate the sequence of steps performed by an adversary to commit theiroffences. For example, in a romance scam, fraudsters create a fake account on a datingprofile, the identify a suitable victim, go through a grooming phase, followed by the actualfraud when the scammer asks their victim for money. Dissecting the various steps of anoffence can be useful to better understand it and to identify potential interventions. Crimescripting is somewhat related to kill chains, although the two techniques were developed incompletely independent areas.
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Modelling the underground economy as a flow of capital
As discussed in Section 1, many malicious operations are performed by criminals with thegoal of making money from their victims. For this reason, following the flow of money is auseful way to better understand malicious operations, and in particular identify bottlenecksthat could be leveraged to develop mitigations against them and stop criminals [99, 148].
Thomas et al. presented a model that is designed to keep track of a money flow within acybercriminal operation [149]. As part of this model, they introduced two elements that areneeded for a cybercrime operation to run: profit centres, through which victims transfer newcapital into the criminal operation, and support centres, which can facilitate the criminal oper-ation by providing several services for a fee. Money is introduced into the ecosystem throughprofit centres, and is then consumed by the various actors involved in it, who provide tools andservices for each other. As an example, in an email spam operation, the profit centre wouldbe victims purchasing counterfeit pharmaceuticals from an affiliate programme, while all theservices needed by the spammers to operate (e.g., bulletproof hosting providers to host theC&C servers, pay-per-install services to deliver the malware, content generation services tocreate the spam content) are support centres. This model provides an interesting concep-tualisation of how money flows into the cybercriminal ecosystem and how wealth is dividedbetween the different actors there. By cross-referencing it with real world data, it can alsohelp to form an idea of the profit that each criminal is making, and of the revenue of theoperation.
Another interesting aspect of tracing the cash flow of cybercriminal operations is that atsome point the criminals will want to cash out, which will be done using traditional paymentmethods (see Section 2). Since these interactions happen in the physical world, it is easierfor law enforcement to trace them and potentially apprehend the criminals [148].
Attack attribution
When talking about malicious activities, attribution is important. Law enforcement is inter-ested in understanding what criminals are behind a certain operation, and in particular at-tributing apparently unrelated cybercriminal operations to the same actors could help builda legal case against them. In similar fashion, governments are interested in identifying theculprits behind the attacks that they receive. In particular, they are interested in finding whichnation states (i.e., countries) are behind these attacks.
Attribution, however, is a controversial topic in cyberspace. As we discussed previously, theconcept of ‘place’ is relative for computer attacks, and attackers can easily route their net-work connections through proxies or compromised machines in third countries, thus hidingtheir actual location. It is reasonable to assume that the same actors will follow a similarmodus operandi in their attacks, and in particular will use the same software exploits to breakinto their victims’ systems. These exploits and code artefacts could be used to identify state-sponsored groups or other attackers (See the Malware & Attack Technology CyBOK Knowl-edge Area [150], for more details). Unfortunately, this approach has two main drawbacks.The first is that the commodisation of cybercrime services has enabled attackers to use ex-ploit kits, which contain a large number of exploits and, therefore, increase the likelihood ofan attack happening. While advantageous for attackers, this trend means that the exploitsused become a less significant signal for identifying attackers, especially those who do nothave the sophistication to exploit vulnerabilities in house (e.g., cyber-enabled cybercriminals).The exception to this trend is state-sponsored actors, who unlike traditional criminals usually
KA Adversarial Behaviours | October 2019 Page 25
The Cyber Security Body Of Knowledge
www.cybok.org
have very specific targets. For this reason, they can tailor their attacks more carefully, andeven develop new exploits to hit a specific victim. Most importantly, they often develop ex-ploits for vulnerabilities that are not publicly known, also known as zero days attacks [89].Being unique to an actor, they could be used to identify who is behind a specific attack. Anissue here is that, once an exploit is used, it could be intercepted by the victim (or anyone onthe network) and later used against another target affected by the same vulnerability. Thiswould actively mislead attribution. Recent leaks have shown that the CIA has been activelycollecting exploits used by other nation states and adding them to their arsenal, thus allowingthem to make it look like another country was behind any given computer attack.8
Rid et al. proposed a framework to systematise the attribution efforts of cyberattacks [133].Within this framework, they identified three layers of analysis that are needed to correctlyperform attribution: tactical, operational and strategic. The tactical component consists ofunderstanding the technical aspects that composed the attack (the how), the operationalcomponent consists of understanding the attack’s high-level characteristics architecture andthe type of attacker that we are dealing with (the what), while the strategic component dealswith understanding the motivation behind the attack (the why).
While this framework was developed with state-sponsored attacks in mind, it could be usedto attribute other types of malicious activity. For example, to attribute an online hate attackorchestrated by 4chan’s Politically Incorrect Board, [27] one could trace the hate messagesreaching the victim (how), observe the personal information of the victim on the board (what)and analyse the discussion about the victim to understand the motivation behind the attack(why).
CONCLUSION
In this document, we presented an overview of the adversarial behaviours that exist on theInternet at the time of writing. We surveyed various types of malicious operations, depend-ing on the attacker’s motivations and capabilities, and analysed the components that arerequired to set up successful malicious operations. Finally, we described a number of mod-elling techniques from a variety of fields (computer science, criminology, war studies) thatcan help researchers and practitioners to better model these operations. We argued that hav-ing good models is of fundamental importance to developing effective mitigations that aredifficult to circumvent.
8https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vault 7
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ACRONYMS
AOL America Online.
ATM Automated Teller Machine..
C&C Command and Control.
CAPTCHA Completely Automated Public Turing test to tell Computers and Humans Apart.
CIA Central Intelligence Agency.
DDoS Distributed Denial of Service.
DNS Domain Name System.
ISP Internet Service Provider.
LOIC Low Orbit Ion Cannon.
NCA National Crime Agency.
PPI Pay Per Install service.
RAT Remote Access Trojan.
SEO Search Engine Optimization.
SWIFT Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication.
VPN Virtual Private Network.
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